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Abstract 
 
Background: There has been comparatively little research into anosognosia for aphasia (a 
lack of awareness of acquired language deficits). Direct assessments of metacognitive 
awareness tend to rely on high levels of verbal competence and are difficult for people with 
aphasia to complete. Therefore indirect measures of awareness have been considered, notably 
the person’s self-correction of his or her naming errors.  Different mechanisms for self-
correction based in comprehension or production skills have been proposed. In addition, in 
other areas of cognition, the relationships between direct and indirect measures and 
underlying forms of awareness have not been clearly established. 
Aims: The aims of this study were: a) to investigate the relationship between a direct and an 
indirect measure of awareness of aphasia, b) to examine the role of executive functioning in 
performance on both assessment types, and c) to examine the relationship between these 
measures and underlying language comprehension and production skills. 
Methods & Procedures:  Forty-eight people with aphasia participated, drawn from 
rehabilitation hospital caseloads. Participants were assessed on a language battery, a non-
verbal test of executive function, a direct measure of awareness (ratings of difficulties), and 
had self-correction behaviour examined in a 40-item naming test. 
Outcomes & Results: There was a trend relationship between performance on the direct and 
indirect measures. Both related to overall severity of language impairment, with more 
severely impaired people being less aware of their difficulties. The two measures, however, 
dissociated with respect to single-word production and comprehension scores: the direct 
measure related to production and not comprehension, while the indirect measure related to 
comprehension and not production. Executive functioning related only to the direct measure 
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of metacognitive awareness. Within production scores, the rate of correction success rather 
than pre-correction naming rate was associated with metacognitive awareness. 
Conclusions: This study revealed different underlying bases, in language processes and 
executive function, for two measures of anosognosia for aphasia. When used to assess 
awareness of deficits, direct and indirect methods should not be regarded as equivalent. 
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Anosognosia and self-correction of naming errors in aphasia 
 
A lack of awareness of one’s own deficits is known as anosognosia. This intriguing 
phenomenon has been studied in several areas of acquired neurological impairment, including 
motor, visuo-spatial and memory impairments (Prigatano, 2010). Anosognosia for aphasia 
has also been reported (Marshall, Robson, Pring & Chiat, 1998; Maher, Rothi & Heilman, 
1994; Shuren, Hammond, Maher, Rothi & Heilman, 1995; for reviews see Al Banna, Redha, 
Abdulla, Nair & Donnellan, 2016; Kertesz, 2010; Lebrun, 1987). Such reports have been, 
however, infrequent due to the problem of using verbal indices, such as interviews, 
questionnaires or spontaneous comments, to assess the level of awareness of people with 
communication difficulties. These verbal indices are direct measures of metacognitive 
awareness, i.e. they tap the knowledge that a person holds about his or her own abilities and 
difficulties. People with aphasia may not understand the questions and/or may not be able to 
provide responses (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989). 
A theoretical distinction has been made between metacognitive or ‘intellectual’ 
awareness, and ‘emergent’ awareness, which is the recognition of errors as they occur during 
a task. Different relationships between the two have been proposed. While Crosson et al. 
(1989) suggested that intellectual awareness provides the basis for emergent awareness, 
Toglia and Kirk (2000) suggested that instances of (emergent) error detection may lead to the 
development of intellectual awareness. Empirically, in studies of a variety of patient 
populations and cognitive domains, there has been little support for a relationship between 
the two forms of awareness (e.g.; O’Keeffe, Dockree, Moloney, Carton & Robertson, 2007; 
Hoerold, Pender & Robertson, 2013; Goverover, Genova, Griswold, Chiaravalloti & DeLuca, 
2014; but see Dockree, Tarleton, Carton & FitzGerald, 2015). As well as a theoretical 
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distinction between the two, metacognitive and emergent awareness are associated with direct 
and indirect methods of assessment. 
Cocchini, Gregg, Beschin, Dean and Della Sala (2010) produced a direct test of 
metacognitive awareness of aphasia.  In the Visual-Analogue Test Assessing Anosognosia for 
Language Impairment (VATA-L), the person completes rating scales to indicate the extent 
that he or she experiences problems with a variety of language activities. Awareness is 
measured as the discrepancy between the person’s own ratings and those made about them by 
carers. To minimise the impact of aphasia on following the test’s instructions and providing 
responses, the test incorporates pictures to illustrate the activities in question, and responses 
are made by pointing to a non-verbal scale. The measure has been used to scope the incidence 
of anosognosia for aphasia (18.9% of those tested by Cocchini et al., 2010), and to explore 
the relationships between anosognosia and depression in people with aphasia (Cocchini, 
Crosta, Allen, Zaro, & Beschin, 2013), anosognosia and language difficulties in people with 
dementia (Savage, Piguet & Hodges, 2015), and awareness of aphasia and apraxia (Canzano, 
Scandola, Pernigo, Aglioti & Moro, 2014). 
The measure of awareness in the VATA-L depends on both the person with aphasia 
and the caregiver’s ratings for that individual, both based on subjective information and 
which may be affected by various personal factors (e.g., Prigatano, 2000).  Studies have 
found agreement between these two sources of ratings (e.g. Rautakoski, Korpijaakko-
Huuhka, & Klippi, 2008). Where differences exist, they tend to be in the direction of the 
person with aphasia producing ratings of better skills (e.g. Cocchini et al., 2010; Hesketh, 
Long, Bowen et al., 2011). Family and friends also tend to rate skills as superior to 
professional caregivers (e.g. De Jong-Hagelstein, et al., 2012). The inclusion of family 
members in establishing cut-off scores in the VATA-L therefore provides a conservative 
method for defining a lack of awareness. The VATA-L also includes ‘check questions’ with 
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objectively correct responses, designed to eliminate people who have not understood the task 
requirements. 
An alternative to a direct test, and one which side-steps the difficulty of designing 
accessible measures for people with communication difficulties, is to look for evidence in the 
person’s behaviour that indirectly reveals his or her knowledge of deficits. In aphasia, the 
person’s ability to self-correct errors in spoken language production has been proposed to this 
end (Marshall & Tomkins, 1982). Self-correction is therefore (potentially) a measure of 
emergent rather than metacognitive awareness, the correction being made at the time of an 
instance of difficulty (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Two main mechanisms within language 
processes have been proposed to underlie the ability to self-correct. 
The first is the Perceptual Loop hypothesis (Hartsuiker & Kolk, 2001; Levelt, 1989; 
Postma, 2000). According to this hypothesis, language output is monitored and errors 
detected by the person’s own comprehension system. Output may be monitored after it is 
overtly produced, or at a pre-articulatory stage as ‘inner speech’ (Alderson-Day & 
Fernyhough, 2015). People with impaired comprehension fail to detect and thence correct 
errors, leading to phonologically and/or semantically errorful spoken output as occurs in 
fluent jargon aphasia. An alternative to the Perceptual Loop hypothesis is a mechanism in 
which errors are detected and correction is initiated within speech production processes 
themselves. Marshall et al. (1998) provided support for this approach in their study of a man 
with jargon aphasia and relatively good comprehension, attributing self-monitoring 
difficulties specifically to the process of accessing phonology from semantics, proposing that 
errors are detected by feedback mechanisms between these two layers of processing. Nozari, 
Dell and Schwartz (2011) described a model in which errors are detected by a different 
mechanism in production, namely due to conflict at the stage of selection between alternative 
responses. That this mechanism is feasible was supported when the model was applied to data 
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from a group of people with aphasia. No correlation between error detection and 
comprehension skills was found. 
Not all attempts at self-correction are the same. Schlenck, Huber and Willmes (1987) 
provided a useful taxonomy in a study of corrections made by people with aphasia during 
picture description with sentences. Correction behaviours, whether ultimately successful or 
not, included pauses, filled pauses or interjections, repetition of preceding utterances, 
phonemic approximations to the target, and circumlocutions or semantic approximations. 
Schlenck et al. (1987) made a distinction between repairs, which occur after an overt error 
and are attempts to modify it, and prepairs which are not preceded by an error but which 
relate to the following word.  The majority of self-corrections seen in their study were 
prepairs, while repairs were not made by people with aphasia at a rate greater than that of 
control participants (despite people with aphasia making many more errors). The frequency 
of prepairs correlated significantly with comprehension scores at the level of the group. 
Examining individual participants, Schlenck et al. (1987) found relationships between both 
comprehension and production skills and the rate of prepair corrections. They concluded that 
there is evidence for both comprehension- and production-based monitoring. 
The relationship between direct and indirect measures of awareness for aphasia, such 
as self-reports and self-correction rate, remains uncertain. The tests may, despite being 
different methods, reflect a single form of awareness, or may alternatively tap different 
(metacognitive and emergent) forms of awareness, deriving from different aspects of 
language processing to different degrees.  The aims of the present study are threefold. First, 
we investigated the relationship between a direct measure of awareness of language 
difficulties (the VATA-L) and an indirect measure (self-correction in naming). Secondly, we 
examined these measures in terms of participants’ language comprehension and production 
skills. A relationship with comprehension skills would be consistent with the Perceptual Loop 
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hypothesis for error detection, while a relationship with production skills would be consistent 
with production-based mechanisms of error detection. Finally, we examined the role of 
executive functioning in performance on the two measures of awareness. Metacognitive 
awareness (in domains of cognition other than language) has typically been described as 
conscious (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Koriat, 2007) and dependent on executive 
functioning (Bivona et al., 2008; Goverover et al., 2014; Shimamura, 2000). An association 
between tests of metacognitive awareness and tests of executive function has not, however, 
been clearly established by experimental studies (e.g., Gasquoine, 2016). The Perceptual 
Loop account of self-correction in aphasia has been characterised as conscious and 
demanding of attentional resources (Levelt, 1989; Postma, 2000), whereas, production-based 
monitoring has been described variously as automatic, with autonomous resources (Postma, 
2000) or as requiring central cognitive control (Gauvin, De Baene, Brass & Hartsuiker, 
2016). 
 
Method 
Participants 
 
Forty-eight people with aphasia participated in this study. Participants were recruited 
as volunteers from in-patient and community neurological rehabilitation caseloads in Italy 
and the UK according to the following inclusion criteria: they were over 18 years of age, each 
had left hemisphere acquired brain injury confirmed by CT or MRI scan, and each had a 
diagnosis of aphasia as conferred by his or her healthcare teams following routine clinical 
assessment. Demographic and aetiological information is presented in Table 1. For the three 
individuals with bilateral injuries, these were sustained simultaneously. No participant had a 
previous neurological condition. 
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-------Insert Table 1 about here------- 
Thirty-eight participants were tested in Italy and had Italian as their first language; 10 
tested in the UK had English as their first language. Participants were tested individually, 
either within one session or in two sessions separated by no more than 7 days. All participants 
gave informed consent prior to participating in the study according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki. The study was approved by the Italian and the UK NHS Ethical Committees. 
 
Assessments 
 
Language assessment. All participants completed the Aachen Aphasia Test (AAT), a 
battery of language assessments standardised in Italian and English versions (Luzzatti, de 
Bleser, & Willmes, 1991; Miller, Willmes & de Bleser, 2000). The AAT includes various 
sub-tests of comprehension (auditory comprehension, reading comprehension) and language 
production (spontaneous speech, repetition, naming, and writing). Each sub-test score (with 
the exception of the spontaneous speech scales) is converted to a percentile (where higher 
percentiles indicate better performance) and compared with normative data to indicate the 
possible degree of impairment, from 1 (very mild) to 4 (severe). 
  
Awareness of language difficulties. The Visual-Analogue Test Assessing 
Anosognosia for Language Impairment (VATA-L; Cocchini et al., 2010) is a 14-item 
questionnaire in which individuals rate the ease or difficulty they experience in a number of 
different communication activities, from 0 (no problem) to 3 (major problem).  The 
questionnaire is made accessible to people with aphasia through use of pictures to support 
understanding of the items, and through use of a visual-analogue scale as a means to respond. 
The overall score can range from 0 to 42.  Four additional check questions elicit responses 
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made at either end of the responses scale. The rating of the check questions is not included in 
the final VATA-L score; however participants who fail to provide the expected response to 
any of the check questions are excluded as their use of the measure cannot be considered 
reliable. As well as participants with aphasia completing the questionnaire about themselves, 
a family member and/or a professional carer (e.g. a therapist, medic, nurse, or psychologist) 
also completed the questionnaire about them.  Five of the participants had ratings provided by 
family members only, 9 by professional carers only, and 34 by both.  Where two carer ratings 
were obtained, an average value was taken. Discrepancies between participants’ and carers’ 
ratings were compared with norms (Cocchini et al., 2010). Discrepancies higher than 13 
points indicate lack of awareness of language difficulties, scores between 12 and 13 indicate 
borderline performance, and discrepancies equal to or lower than 11.9 indicate preserved 
awareness. Family members and professional caregivers give similar ratings, and test-retest 
reliability for the VATA-L is high (Cocchini et al., 2010). There is an absence of validity data 
as there are not, to our knowledge, other direct tests of awareness of language deficits in 
aphasia. Direct tests of awareness for other cognitive and for motor deficits have adopted 
similar methods (e.g. Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin & Cameron, 2009; Smith, Della Sala, 
Logie & Maylor, 2000). 
 
Self-correction behaviours in naming. Participants named 40 line drawings of 
objects (PALPA subtest 53; Kay, Lesser & Coltheart, 1992). No time constraints or limits on 
the number of naming attempts were made. Participants indicated when they wished to end 
their naming attempt and move on to the next item via pointing to a choice of card 
(illustrating a thumb up and the word ‘Correct’ or an arrow and the word ‘Pass’). They 
received no feedback as to whether the response was in fact correct or incorrect. Responses 
were all audio recorded for later analyses. 
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Performance was scored for accuracy of the initial naming attempt, and for the 
presence of subsequent self-correction behaviours derived from the set proposed by Schlenck 
et al. (1987).  These included subsequent naming attempts (whether correct or not) and also 
phonemic approximations, circumlocutions or semantic approximations to the target, and 
comments on own performance. ‘Pass’ responses were considered as comments, equivalent 
to stating “No, I can’t get this one”. Pauses of 2 or more seconds after a response were also 
counted as self-corrections if terminated by a subsequent naming response, self-correction 
behaviour or use of the correct/pass card. Filled pauses, or interjections, were similarly 
classified as self-corrections.  We excluded, however, all trials that started with a pause or 
filled pause as, for these trials, we do not know whether (a) the participant produced a naming 
attempt after covert correction, or (b) the pause reflects slowed lexical retrieval (Nickels & 
Howard, 1995). Examples of each type of correction are given in Table 2. For the sake of 
clarity, we adopt the expression ‘Self-correction behaviours’ to refer to all types of responses 
discussed above. 
----- Insert Table 2 about here----- 
For each object picture, participants were assigned a pre-correction naming accuracy 
score based on the initial component of their response (0= incorrect; 1= correct), a self-
correction behaviour score (0= no self-correction behaviours; 1= self-correction behaviours) 
and a post-correction naming accuracy score (0= incorrect; 1= correct).  Across the 40 items, 
the two naming scores were used to calculate a pre-correction and a post-correction naming 
rate.  A self-correction behaviour rate was calculated as the proportion of initially incorrect 
responses that were followed by one or more self-correction behaviours (regardless of 
whether this correction was successful or not.)   A self-correction success rate was calculated 
as the proportion of initially incorrect responses that were subsequently successfully 
corrected to the target response. 
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Executive functioning. Executive functioning was assessed using the Brixton spatial 
anticipation test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). In this test, participants are presented with a 
series of pages, each of which displays an array of dots, one of which is coloured. 
Participants respond by indicating the location that they anticipate the coloured dot will 
occupy on the next page.  Over the series, the location of the dot changes within the array 
according to pre-determined sequences and sequence changes.  The test is therefore one of 
rule detection and application. It is scored in terms of number of errors over 55 trials, with a 
maximum error score of 54.  The Brixton test is a suitable assessment of executive function 
for people with aphasia due to its non-verbal stimuli and response options (Strauss, Sherman 
& Spreen, 2006). The test instructions, which are spoken, also contain a modelled sequence 
of pointing responses. It is difficult to ensure unequivocally that instructions have been 
understood in the case of pathological performance, however, failure to understand the task 
requirements would lead to non-responding or chance level scores (48/54 errors), which were 
not seen in our sample. 
 
Results 
 
Assessment of language difficulties and executive functioning 
 
The average total AAT percentile score for the group of people with aphasia was 57.1 
(sd= 28.4). There was a wide range of overall production scores (range 0-91.9) and of 
comprehension scores (range 16.1-99.3). The aphasia subtypes of the group are shown in 
Table 3, based on their pattern of performance across tests in the AAT. 
---Table 3 about here--- 
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In the following analyses, the AAT auditory word-to-picture matching subtest score 
was used as the measure of each participant’s comprehension rather than the composite 
scores of the AAT, and the PALPA object naming subtest score was used as the measure of 
production skills. The processing demands of these single word tasks most closely reflect the 
demands of single object naming and error detection which were the focus of our study, 
whereas the AAT composite score incorporates sentence-level processing. 
 
Direct and indirect measures of awareness 
 
Thirty-four out of 48 participants (71%) were fully aware of their language 
impairment in the direct measure, according to the VATA-L scoring system. Three (6%) 
were considered as borderline, and 11 (23%) were classified as unaware. There were no 
reliable differences between the aware and unaware groups in terms of the age of participants 
(t=0.31, df=41, ns) or the time post-onset of injury (t=0.37, df=41, ns).  Table 3 presents the 
breakdown of the VATA-L sub groups in terms of the type and severity of aphasia as 
determined by the AAT. A series of chi-square analyses investigated whether any sub-type of 
aphasia was more often associated with unawareness; no significant effects were found.   
Self-correction behaviour rate was calculated from analysis of the 40 item PALPA 
naming task. Data from 2 participants (one aware, one unaware on the VATA-L), were 
excluded as these participants scored zero correct by indicating ‘pass’ to all 40 items as their 
initial and only response.  They were excluded because we cannot determine whether they 
covertly attempted each item and subsequently indicated that they could not name it, or 
whether they were immediately making a pass response without considering the item.  Of the 
46 participants entering subsequent analyses, eight also scored zero on the naming task and 
made some pass responses, but did also make overt responses indicating an attempt at 
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naming.  For these participants, we scored the pass responses as comments (see above). 
Overall, the proportion of errors that were followed by self-correction behaviours was 
.56 (sd= 0.36). Self-correction behaviour rate was not associated with age of the participants 
(Spearman’s r=-.12, ns) nor with the time since onset of their difficulties (r=-.14, ns). 
Table 4 contains summary data for the whole group and the VATA-L awareness sub-
groups. 
---Table 4 about here--- 
 
Relationship between direct and indirect measures of awareness 
 
An independent samples t-test found a trend for the VATA-L aware group to produce 
self-correction behaviours at a higher rate (mean=.60) than the VATA-L unaware group 
(mean=.38; t=1.712, df=41, p<.10).  As the unaware group is small in this comparison, we 
also used the VATA-L discrepancy score as a continuous measure of awareness; there was 
again a trend for more aware participants on this direct measure to produce self-correction 
behaviours at a higher rate (Spearman’s r=.250, p<.10). 
 
Relationships between measures of awareness, language production and 
comprehension, and executive functions 
 
The VATA-L aware and unaware groups differed with respect to overall severity of 
aphasia, with the aware group scoring higher on the AAT (mean percentile=64.8) than the 
unaware group (mean=34.1; t=3.53, df=41, p<.01). Examining component language scores, 
the aware group were better at naming (mean PALPA object naming=24/40 vs 12/40 correct 
respectively; t=2.50, df=41, p<.05). The groups did not however differ in comprehension 
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(t=0.20, df=41, ns).  A higher proportion of the aware group were classed as impaired on the 
Brixton test (.44 vs .30), however this was not a reliable difference (Fisher’s Exact Test, 
p=.44). 
This pattern was confirmed when the VATA-L discrepancy score was used as the 
direct measure of awareness. As production (PALPA object naming) and comprehension 
(AAT auditory word-to-picture matching) scores themselves correlate (Spearman’s r=.48, 
p<.01), multiple regression was used to estimate the unique effect of each language variable 
and executive function (number of errors) on the measure of awareness. This revealed a 
significant effect of production (β=-.35, t=-2.22, p<.05) and no reliable effect for 
comprehension (β=.11, t=.68, ns). There was a trend effect for executive function (β=-.26, t=-
2.73, p<.10), with more errors on the Brixton test relating to greater discrepancy between 
participants and their carers’ ratings of language difficulties. 
For the indirect measure self-correction behaviour rate, there was also a correlation 
with overall severity of aphasia, with those more likely to correct being less severely 
impaired (r=.350, p<.05). The single-word language test and executive function test scores 
were entered into a multiple regression analysis; this revealed an effect of comprehension 
only (β=.48, t=3.09, p<.01), with no effect of production (β=.02, t=0.12, ns), nor of executive 
function (β=.10, t=0.71, ns). 
A final set of analyses considered production scores and their relationship with the 
VATA-L more closely.  The score on the PALPA naming test reflects the accuracy of the 
initial attempt (‘pre-correction naming’) plus any additional items that were successfully 
corrected. We carried out an analysis in which these two components of the naming score 
were separately examined. Self-correction success rate was calculated as the proportion of 
errors on this task that were subsequently corrected to the target response.  Correlation 
analyses revealed that participants with better pre-correction naming were not reliably more 
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likely to attempt self-correction (Spearman’s r=-.05, ns); they were, however, more likely to 
be successful in the correction attempts they made (Spearman’s r= .347, p<.05). A multiple 
regression analysis including the two component production scores (pre-correction naming 
and self-correction success rate), along with comprehension and executive function, against 
VATA-L discrepancy scores revealed no effect for pre-correction naming (β=-.06, t=.33, ns) 
but a reliable effect for self-correction success rate (β=-.47, t=-2.36, p<.05) and for executive 
function (β=-.30, t=-2.02, p=.050). 
 
Discussion 
 
We add to the literature on anosognosia by demonstrating dissociation between direct 
and indirect measures of awareness in the domain of language, and further characterise the 
underlying processes. This study employed two measures: a direct, questionnaire-based 
metacognitive measure (the VATA-L; Cocchini et al., 2010) and an indirect, online measure, 
namely the rate at which self-correction of naming errors was attempted. We found a trend 
but not a statistically reliable relationship between the two. This finding is consistent with 
studies that have not found strong associations between metacognitive and indirect measures 
of awareness in other domains of cognitive impairment and following different types of 
acquired brain injury (e.g., Hoerold, Pender & Robertson, 2013; O'Keeffe et al., 2007; 
Cocchini, Beschin, Fotopoulou & Della Sala, 2010; Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordioli, & 
Aglioti, 2011). 
Performance on both direct and indirect measures of awareness related to overall 
severity of language impairment.  Importantly, however, the two measures dissociated with 
respect to the participants’ production and comprehension skills when the unique contribution 
of these was examined in multiple regression analyses.  The direct measure of metacognitive 
 ANOSOGNOSIA AND SELF-CORRECTION IN APHASIA 17 
awareness related to production and not comprehension scores, while the indirect measure 
related to comprehension and not production scores. This pattern of results challenges the 
conclusion that the two measures have the same underlying basis, with one of the measures 
being more sensitive to impairment than the other, which could lead to a single but not the 
double dissociation (Gasquoine, 2016). Rather, the two measures have different underlying 
bases in language processes. In other domains of impairment, such as hemiplegia, visuo-
spatial neglect and amnesia, researchers have also been led to conclude that directly and 
indirectly assessed forms of awareness have different bases (Berti, Làdavas, Della Corte, 
1996; Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2010; Schacter, 1990; Mograbi, & 
Morris, 2013; see Nurmi & Jehkonen, 2014, for a review). While our findings support this 
distinction, they do not support the notion that one form of awareness is predicated on the 
other (Crosson et al., 1989; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). 
 At the whole group level, we found an association between self-correction behaviour 
rate and comprehension scores (see also Schlenk et al., 1987). This is consistent with the 
Perceptual Loop hypothesis, which proposes that speakers monitor their output and detect 
errors using their comprehension system (Hartsuiker & Kolk, 2001; Levelt, 1989). We did 
not find a relationship between self-correction behaviour and production skills and so found 
no evidence to support a production-based mechanisms of error monitoring (Marshall et al., 
1998; Nozari, Dell & Schwartz, 2011). We did, however, find a relationship between 
metacognitive awareness and production scores. The fact that it was the contribution of 
successful corrections to the naming score rather than the pre-correction naming rate that 
bore this relationship is a novel finding. This suggests either (a) that metacognitive awareness 
moderates attempts at self-correction, such that they are made when the speaker knows that 
he or she will be successful, or alternatively (b) that metacognitive awareness arises through 
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the experience of successful correction (cf. Toglia & Kirk’s (2000) proposal that intellectual 
awareness develops through instances of emergent awareness). 
Metacognitive awareness has been described as a controlled process, dependent on 
central resources (e.g., Shimamura, 2000). Our finding of a relationship between performance 
on the Brixton test of executive function and the direct test of metacognitive awareness 
provides support for this view in the domain of language, with those participants showing 
better executive function making more objective ratings of their own skills. No role for 
executive function (at least as measured by the Brixton test) in determining the rate of self-
correction was found, providing no support for characterisation of the Perceptual Loop as a 
centrally controlled mechanism. 
The obvious caveats should be raised in drawing conclusions from non-significant 
results, where the lack of effects may be due to aspects of methodology. Our study was 
limited in its use of a single test of executive function, chosen because of its suitability for 
assessing people with language difficulties. Executive functioning is known to fractionate 
(Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000; MacPherson & Della Sala, 
2005; Logie, 2016) and we did not explore which of its component processes may be 
involved in the different aspects of awareness for language difficulties. Related to this point, 
it would have been useful to have included measures of attention and prospective memory in 
the study, as these are implicated in some accounts of error monitoring in other domains of 
cognition (Dockree et al., 2015; O’Keeffe et al., 2007; Maher et al., 1994).  Another potential 
methodological limitation relates to the size of the unaware subgroup as determined by the 
VATA-L. The subgroup comprised only 11 participants (of 48 in the study). This may have 
impacted on power in statistical tests that compared the awareness subgroups. This possibility 
motivated our use of the VATA-L discrepancy score as a continuous variable across all 
participants in the study, to explore relationships with self-correction rate and language 
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production and comprehension scores. Interestingly, in doing so, we found the same pattern 
of significant effects as with the two groups defined by a cut-off score. 
There are currently no other direct tests of awareness of language difficulties against 
which to establish the VATA-L’s validity. It is a composite measure, assessing awareness of 
a range of language difficulties, including both comprehension and production of auditory 
and written verbal information that may be experienced in everyday life. As such, it is 
possible that its sub-components behave differently and have different sensitivity with respect 
to other variables. This may include different relationships with self-correction behaviours in 
other contexts such as sentence production (as used in Schlenck et al.’s 1987 study), 
discourse or in conversation, where the opportunities to avoid errors through choice of words 
and decisions about whether to correct or not (such as there are consciously made) may be 
different. 
Though test-retest reliability of the VATA-L is high (Cocchini et al., 2010), we do not 
have test-retest nor inter-rater reliability measures for our self-correction behaviour measure. 
This is a methodological limitation that would benefit from future study. 
No direct nor indirect measures of awareness are routinely used in the clinical 
management of people with aphasia. This matters, given the poorer rehabilitation outcomes 
for people with anosognosia for a range of acquired difficulties as identified by direct 
measures (Jenkinson, Preston & Ellis, 2011; Gialanella & Mattioli, 1992; Rüsch & Corrigan, 
2002; Fillingham, Sage & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Appelros, 2007). The predictive value of 
indirect measures such as self-correction rates on rehabilitation outcomes has not been 
established. It is worth noting that self-correction is itself an adaptive behaviour, contributing 
to communicative success. An attempt at correction may lead to the correct target item being 
produced.   Even if not successful, an attempt at correction may convey to a communication 
partner that an error has been made. Tompkins, Scharp and Marshall (2006) dubbed the 
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behaviours produced following word finding difficulties “self-cues”, making a distinction 
between behaviours which lead to improved word finding and those that enhance 
communication of the speaker’s intended message. In the conversation analysis literature, 
attempts at self-correction have been termed “trouble-indicating behaviours”, and while the 
correction itself may be difficult for the person with aphasia to complete (e.g., Wilkinson, 
2007), a repair to communicative breakdown may be made by the conversation partner after 
it has been indicated (e.g., Barnes & Ferguson, 2014). Self-corrections therefore belong to a 
broad class of pragmatic abilities (see, e.g. Hernández-Sacristán, Rosell-Clari, Serra-Alegre 
& Quiles-Climent, 2012). Our study highlights the importance of considering both direct and 
indirect measures in investigations of language presentation and rehabilitation, as they cannot 
be regarded as tapping some unitary ‘awareness’ of deficit. 
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